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VALIDATION and VERIFICATION of SMART CONTRACTS:  A RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
AUTHORS:  Daniele Magazzeni, Peter McBurney and William Nash. 
 
ABSTRACT:  
 
In this paper, we explore some of the issues and research challenges involved in the validation 
and verification of smart contracts, particularly those running over blockchains and distributed 
ledgers. Smart contracts may encode legal contracts written in natural language, and these in 
turn may be intended to represent in written form the shared understandings and shared 
intentions of the contracting parties.  Thus, automation of the validation and verification of smart 
contracts will require formal (machine-readable) representations of the program code of the 
smart contract and of the written natural language contract.  Because distributed ledgers are a 
form of multi-agent (machine-to-machine) communication, where participating nodes 
communicate via pre-specified communications protocols, formal representation of the program 
code is able to draw on research exploring the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of agent 
communications protocols.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The world of commercial computing and information technology has been recently become very 
excited by a new technology, called variously blockchains, distributed ledgers, and/or shared 
ledgers.  The underlying blockchain technology was invented in 2008 to support the creation 
and exchange of a cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, without need for a controlling central authority [1]. 
The Blockchain platform and associated cryptocurrency were implemented and launched in 
2009.  In the years since, many people have seen potential for applications for this technology, 
particularly in finance and government.  For instance, in the financial sector, more than 70 
global financial institutions have partnered in the R3 consortium, which has recently released a 
conceptual framework, Corda, for smart contracts in finance [2].  To any participant old enough, 
the level of excitement is only matched by that for the emerging World-Wide-Web in the middle 
1990s.  
 
A distributed ledger is a shared database, fully replicated at multiple autonomous sites or nodes, 
and without any node having central or privileged control.  Updates to the database require 
execution of an agreed multi-node decision-protocol; normally, data may only be appended to 
but not erased from the shared database.  A blockchain is a special type of distributed ledger, 
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where the data is collated into “blocks” before being added to the shared database, and the 
blocks are linked together to form a single sequential chain.  Cryptographic methods may be 
used to encrypt data, to authorize data for upload, and to chain blocks together.  The Bitcoin 
blockchain was invented for issuing, executing, and recording transactions of a cryptocurrency, 
Bitcoin.  A distributed ledger may also use or support an electronic currency, even if the 
database is intended for other purposes.  Participation in such a network may be open to 
anybody, as is the Bitcoin blockchain, or a node may require pre-authorization and perhaps 
identification to join.  Distributed ledgers requiring pre-authorization are called “permissioned 
ledgers” while open networks are called “permission-less”.  Permissioned ledgers will typically 
enable participants to identify one another, unlike the pseudonymity of many permission-less 
ledgers.  Different applications will require different system architectures and designs.  
 
What is the reason for the excitement about this technology? We can answer this by comparing 
the technology to the Web.  The Web made it relatively easy to share information between one 
person or organization and others, either by placing the information directly onto a web-page, or 
by enabling access via a webpage to the information (eg, when stored in a database).  One way 
to view a web-page, therefore, is as akin to a blackboard, where one person (controller of the 
server) has the power to write contents onto the board, and to erase contents from it.  If the 
web-page is public, then anyone else may read the current contents of the board.  If the web-
page requires access permission (as, for example, subscription newspaper sites do), then the 
ability to read the contents may be limited to a private group.  
 
Under this metaphor, Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) provide the readers of the 
blackboard with some extra powers, at the possible expense of the powers of a writer.   
Distributed Ledgers only allow content to be written to the blackboard if the readers first agree, 
according to some pre-specified voting rules.  For example, readers may all have to agree for 
content to be added, or a majority may have to agree, or a particular nominated reader may 
have to agree.  Contents are added to the board in a manner which links them cryptographically 
to the past contents of the board, which is the “chain” of blockchain.  In addition, the contents of 
the board are impossible to erase. Indeed, “erasure” may only be possible by starting a new 
board which is the same as the original blackboard up to the point just prior to that where the 
contents are to be erased.  Because this action creates two parallel chains which are identical to 
the point where they diverge, the process is called “forking” the blockchain. 
 
These additional rights for readers create some interesting consequences, which explain much 
of the excitement.  The first consequence is that anyone writing onto the board knows that the 
other participants (the readers) have seen the content.  They must have seen it to vote on it 
before it was uploaded to the board.  Everyone party to the distributed ledger knows the same 
content (ie, the participants have “shared state” for the variables on the ledger) and everyone  
3 
 
knows that everyone knows this, and so on.  In the language of game theory [3], the participants 
have “Common Knowledge”. This makes it impossible for a participant to plausibly repudiate the 
content of a shared ledger at a subsequent time. Second, the chaining of content means that 
any change to past contents requires changes to all the later contents.  Such changes could not 
happen surreptitiously, and, like all proposed writing to the board, would themselves require 
prior approval from the participants.  Hence, the past records are effectively immutable.  Third, 
the shared ledger is not stored on only one machine, but copies are stored locally, on each of 
the machines of the participants. Every reader has their copy of the board, and these copies 
stay in synch with each other.  This creates significant challenges for anyone wishing to corrupt 
or alter the contents, as every participant machine would need to be hacked.  
 
These properties are the origin of the many statements that DLT eliminate the need for trust.  
Two or more parties engaging in a transaction online need to be sure that commitments will be 
honored and that individual actions of multi-step transactions will not be reversed.  Traditionally 
parties who did not know one another would use a third party, often a law firm, bank or other 
regulated entity, whom they each trusted to assist with this, for example, by acting as a witness 
to promises and by holding funds in escrow until other steps of a transaction were completed. 
DLT ensures that all promises and actions are witnessed by all the participants in the shared 
ledger, not only the parties to the transaction, and makes it difficult or impossible for any party 
subsequently to repudiate, corrupt or reverse the actions undertaken. Of course, the participants 
may not need a trusted third party to witness their individual transactions, but they will still need 
to trust the software being used.  
 
 
2.  Smart Contracts 
Anything expressible in digital form may be written on an electronic blackboard. In addition to 
transaction data, a distributed ledger may also hold computer programs.  Such programs could 
use data from blockchain records as inputs and then generate outputs which are in turn written 
to that same or to another blockchain.  If stored on a blockchain and executed, their execution 
will take place locally at each participant node connected to the blockchain.  Because many of 
the applications envisioned for distributed ledgers involve co-ordination between distinct people 
or organizations, an obvious application of such computer programs is for the automatic 
execution of business workflows across multiple organizations. For example, the legal 
movement of physical goods from one country to another typically requires expert and import 
permissions from the countries involved.  Associated with these permissions may be taxes or 
duties, evidence of payment of which is required for the relevant permissions to be granted.  
The vendors and/or buyers of these goods may require bridging finance to cover delays in 
receipt of payments or goods, and they may purchase  insurances of various forms along the 
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chain. There may be multiple parties – vendors and buyers of the goods; transporters, banks 
providing trade finance, insurance companies, customs departments of different countries, etc.  
The workflow could – at least, in theory – be managed by a sequence of computer programs 
that execute automatically as successive intermediate milestones in the journey of the physical 
goods are reached.   
 
Such programs are examples of “smart contracts”, terminology invented by Nick Szabo before 
the development of the Blockchain. According to Szabo, a smart contract is “a  set of  promises, 
specified in digital form, including protocols within which the parties perform on these promises” 
[4].  To the extent that such programs embody agreements between two or more organizations, 
distributed ledgers are a natural home for these programs.  The advantage of putting the 
records of these events and the controlling programs onto a distributed ledger is that the various 
parties could all see these programs and monitor the progress of the trade flow as it happens.  
Moreover, the ledger tracks the chain of custody for the assets involved and records their 
provenance.  
 
In addition, smart contracts on distributed ledgers of assets often have the capacity to do ‘real 
time settlement’ for the assets embedded or represented in the ledger.  Where a blockchain is a 
record of who owns what amounts of a cryptocurrency, for example, smart contracts on that 
blockchain can effectively settle transfer of that cryptocurrency in its native form.  Where assets 
are dematerialized and then recorded onto a blockchain, smart contracts can perform the same 
function.  These smart contracts have a feature which they would not have had they been 
recorded on a medium other than the medium in which those assets ‘exist’.  This feature is a 
key reason for the disruptive nature of distributed ledger and smart contract technologies in 
finance. 
 
Because smart contracts embody and execute workflows, they may potentially be used for 
automation of regulatory workflows, for example: reporting and monitoring of required data; 
checking of compliance; approval (or not) by a regulator; and even the levying and payment of 
fines for non-compliance.  Philip Treleaven has termed such applications “RegTech”, and they 
have significant potential for application of AI to governmental and regulatory activities.  
 
As with distributed ledgers themselves, because the technology is still emerging, the nature and 
form of smart contracts are diverse.  For instance, the design of smart contracts may differ 
significantly according to whether or not the distributed ledger on which they execute is 
permissioned (since this influences the ability to identify participants), and whether or not the 
ledger has an internal cryptocurrency.  Murphy and Cooper have proposed a spectrum of 
definitions of smart contracts [5, page 13], according to the extent to which a contract embodies 
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computer code versus natural language.  This is shown in Figure 1 (adapted from page 13 of 
[5]). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Smart contracts lie on a spectrum (from [5], page 13)  
 
At the left-hand extreme position in Figure 1, any agreement between the parties is only 
represented in the form of computer code.  At each of the other positions, there is a role for a 
document written in natural language. The document may duplicate the code, or it may 
complement it.  Even at the left-hand extreme position, where there is no natural language 
document, the code will be intended to execute some intentions of the relevant parties based on 
some shared understandings; both the intentions and the understandings of the parties may be 
implicit.    
 
3.  Validation and Verification 
 
From the spectrum just presented, we can identify three types of component:  electronic 
program code; a natural language contract; and the shared understandings and intentions of the 
parties.  Any particular smart contract may involve all three components or may not, and the role 
played by each component may vary, as indicated in Figure 1.  For smart contract programs to 
execute correctly, we could thus identify several classes of questions as follows, corresponding 
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to the relationships between the different components.  These components and the 
relationships are shown in Figure 2, where the numbers refer to the list of questions here: 
 
1. Does the written natural language contract correctly and fully represent the shared 
understanding and shared intentions of the parties?  
2. Does the computer program correctly encode the written natural language contract? 
3. Does the computer program do what it is intended to do? 
4. Does the computer program do only what it is intended to do?  In other words, does the 
program not do anything it is not intended to do?  
5. If there are multiple computer programs, does the operation of the system as a whole 
perform without error and only in desirable ways?  
 
These questions are instructive for why we can dismiss smart contracts which lack any form of 
natural language component: if the only natural language intention is merely ‘to execute the 
code’, then Questions 1-5 become trivial and all possible outcomes are validated.  This would 
leave owners of the smart contract in a situation where they seemingly desired things they had 
no prior knowledge about.  For instance, if there was a bug in the code (which is very plausible) 
then no developer or participant would know about the bug but the execution of that bug would 
now become ‘intended’ by the owners of the smart contract, without their foreknowledge. Since 
it is not possible to intend something unwittingly, we can see that a smart contract without at 
least a small natural language underpinning is not sensible.    
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Figure 2: Components of smart contract system 
 
In terminology adopted by the IEEE [6], Questions 1 and 2 are about validation – respectively, 
validation of a natural language contract and validation of an individual computer program. 
Questions 3 and 4 are about verification of the properties of a program.  Question 5 concerns 
verification of the properties of a collection or a system of programs.  
 
An example may illustrate these issues.  The recent experience of The DAO, a decentralized 
autonomous organization, is probably well-known to readers [7]. This was an open-source 
computer program created to run over the Ethereum distributed ledger with the aim of pooling 
crowd-sourced funds for investment in startups.  Over a month in May 2016, some 11,000 
investors gave cryptocurrency then valued at more than USD 150 million to it.  While the code 
did what it was intended to do (Question 3), it was also able to be used to do something that 
was not intended (Question 4).  A recursive calling vulnerability was exploited by a malicious 
person (or team) to transfer many of the invested funds to an account he or she (or they) 
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controlled. Here the program code ran correctly and without errors, but in a manner unintended 
by the developers.  Because of inbuilt delays in funds transfers, the community of participants 
were able to reverse this, but only by creating a fork of the Ethereum blockchain, ie, by creating 
another blackboard forked prior to the point of the hack event. 
 
Each of these five validation and verification questions could be answered for any particular 
smart contract by means of analysis undertaken by humans and discussion between the 
relevant parties. The human expertise required for Questions 1 and 2 would include legal 
knowledge and experience, while Questions 2 to 5 would require software development 
expertise and perhaps other computational knowledge and skills.  Using human expertise in this 
way is not scalable, and probably neither efficient nor very accurate.  Our goal is to automate 
the analysis required to answer each of these questions for any proposed smart contract. Is this 
possible?  
 
Formal and automated verification of computer programs has been an active area of research in 
computer science for at least three decades, with several methods now in use.  A common 
method is called model checking, in which the task of program verification involves proving 
properties of a mathematical model of the program.  These techniques have been widely 
applied in industry, for example in the design of computer hardware [8] and autonomous 
underwater vehicles [9].   
 
Most applications of smart contracts being considered in industry are intended to automate or 
semi-automate business processes, which are combinations of sequential, parallel or  
interleaved actions by multiple participants undertaken over time.  For this reason, action 
sequences and message sequence charts (MSCs) are obvious specification and design tools 
for the interactions and communications between participants in distributed ledgers, and 
deterministic finite automata (DFA) an obvious computational model of their operation.  DFA 
present an external view of the actions of a participant or a smart contract a ledger, without 
modeling their internal states.  
 
We can formally model the internal states of entities (participants or smart contracts) and how 
these change over time as they interact with one another, using modal logics having temporal 
and epistemic operators.  For example, Public Announcement Logics (eg, [10]) aim to represent 
updates in the knowledge of hearers when speakers make announcements to a group.  With 
such logics, we may reason about the knowledge of the participants over time and to 
understand, for instance, the extent to which malicious coalitions of nodes may control the 
knowledge of other participants.  A key research challenge here will be formally specifying the 
properties of interest in the modal logic, so that these properties can be verified.  
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An important technique for verification of these programs when considered as part of a larger 
business process will be “trace alignment” [11].  In this approach, we use formal models (DFA 
and/or modal logics) to create expected execution runs, or traces, and then we use another 
formal representation, such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), to undertake the task of 
verification.  Techniques from AI Planning may then be used to automatically fix any mis-
alignments identified.  
 
 
3.1 Verification of smart contracts: Questions 2—5 
 
To apply the methods of formal verification to the five questions above, we will need to have 
certain tools and methodologies in place.  For questions 2-5, we will need a formal (machine-
readable) representation of a smart contract program and its effects on the world in which it 
exists.  If we view a smart contract as just a computer program operating on some real or virtual 
machine, ignoring (for the moment) the fact that it operates in a distributed fashion across 
separate nodes, then this is straightforward, at least in principle.  The theory of program 
language semantics distinguishes several different types of formal representations of programs:   
The first type of semantics, called an axiomatic semantics, defines each program in terms of the 
pre-conditions which must exist before the program can be executed and the post-conditions 
which apply following its execution utterance.  A second type of semantics, an operational 
semantics, considers the smart contract as computational instructions which operate 
successively on the states of some abstract or virtual machine.  The commands in the program 
are thus seen as state-transition operators and the operational semantics defines these 
transitions precisely.  Third, in denotational semantics, each element of the language syntax is 
assigned a relationship to an abstract mathematical entity, its denotation. We then seek to 
reason about the properties of the program by reasoning about the denoted mathematical 
entities, and conversely.   
 
Each of these types of semantics may be applicable to particular classes of smart contract, 
when viewed simply as programs (ie, ignoring the blockchain platform).  For most smart 
contracts, creating both an axiomatic and an operational semantics should be straightforward.  
An operational semantics will be of most value when exploring the properties of collections of 
smart contracts (ie, in trying to answer Question 5), as this semantics should facilitate the 
analysis of effects due to concurrency and  interaction. It may be that verifying desirable 
properties of these programs requires an assumption that the machines which run the contracts 
all have some common implementation environment, possibly a virtual environment.  Thus, 
proving low-level properties – those which depend on the features of particular hardware or 
software installations – may be challenging.  Likewise, assessment of the actual behaviors of a 
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smart contract will require knowledge of the specific distributed ledger it will run on.  This is 
particularly so for those DLs which use an internal currency, as these may create run-time 
incentives or disincentives for particular behaviors.  
 
Smart contracts are intended to read inputs from and write outputs to distributed ledgers, and 
also perhaps themselves sit upon a ledger. By virtue of the fact  that a ledger is shared between 
multiple machines, then the information recorded there is a form of communication between the 
nodes of the ledger.  Thus, we may also view smart contracts as utterances in a dialog between 
the participants to the distributed ledger, with the dialog taking place according to some pre-
defined protocol which all the participants adopt.  Within AI, the last decade has seen 
considerable research in defining formal protocols for automated communications between 
autonomous agents (ie, machine-to-machine communications).  Although not perfect for every 
application, the most widely-used language is the Agent Communications Language FIPA ACL 
of the standards organization IEEE FIPA [12].  This is a language of 22 atomic utterances, 
which has been given a formal syntax and semantics. The semantics has been defined, using a 
modal logic language SL, in terms of the beliefs, desires, and intentions of the agents 
participating in the interaction.  
 
For example, one agent, A say, may inform another agent, B, of some fact p by use of the 
inform locution.  The FIPA ACL semantics of inform only permits agent A to send this message 
to B if: (a) agent A believes p to be true; (b) agent A intends that agent B believes p to be true; 
and (c) agent A believes that agent B does not already have a belief about p.  The language 
ACL has been extended in various ways: for example, the Fatio Protocol [13] adds utterances to 
FIPA ACL to allow agents to argue with one another about some statement, and this has found 
potential application in identifying and resolving conflicting routing policies in the use of the 
Border Gateway Protocol at the Network Layer (Layer 3) of the 5-layer Internet Stack [14].  For 
a review of research on the syntax and semantics of agent communications protocols, see [15]. 
 
The blockchain deployed for Bitcoin records exchanges of bitcoin between participants, and de 
facto ownership records.  Many of the applications for DL technologies proposed initially aimed 
to record similar factual information, each of which what philosophers of language would term 
an assertion (a statement purporting to be a fact about the world).  Some assertions only 
become true by virtue of being uttered, as when records validly uploaded as blocks to the 
Bitcoin Blockchain assert changes of ownership of particular bitcoin.  Such assertions are 
examples of “speech acts”, which are utterances that, when executed appropriately, change the 
state of the world [16].  In exploring potential applications for distributed ledgers, people soon 
realized that other speech acts besides assertions could also be recorded on blockchains, for 
example, promises and commands.  Indeed, as Szabo’s definition of smart contracts quoted 
earlier makes clear, smart contracts may be viewed as sets of conditional promises:  When 
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some external event occurs or when some statement becomes true, then the program promises 
to collect some input variables and execute some program language commands, and then 
export some output variables.   
 
Philosophers of language have long realized that for utterances about actions, such as 
promises, the pragmatics, or norms of usage, are as important as the semantics, or meaning.  
Under what conditions, for example, does a promise take effect?  In most human cultures, a 
promise only takes effect when the intended recipient overtly accepts it.  Similarly, who has the 
power to revoke a promise?  In most cultures, the maker of a promise that has been accepted 
cannot unilaterally revoke it as they wish.  Only the party accepting the promise may declare it 
fulfilled or may revoke it.  These notions have been explored in the law and more recently in 
automated communications between machines [17].  They will play an important role in 
determining that specific program code has desirable properties and not any undesired ones. 
 
3.2 Collections of smart contracts: Question 5 
 
Question 5 concerns verification of system-level properties, where smart contracts may interact 
with one another, and with other programs.  In addition to formal representation of individual 
contracts and their effects, we will also need representation of the collection as a collective, and 
its effects.   A key learning of the history of information technology systems is that real computer 
systems operating on the same machine or in the same computer environment may interact 
with one another in unexpected and  unintended ways.  In particular, the properties of these 
complex adaptive systems may not be able to be predicted or inferred from knowing only the 
properties of the individual components in the system and knowing their rules of interaction.  
Higher-level properties and phenomena may emerge as more individual programs come into 
contact with one  another.  
 
As enterprises deploy multiple blockchains, some public and some private (ie, permissioned), 
each running various smart contracts reading inputs from and writing outputs to these different 
ledgers, predicting and preventing such interaction effects will become increasingly important.  
However, the science of complex systems applied to collections of computer programs and 
ecosystems of IT systems is itself still fairly immature, and computer scientists have only just 
recently begun looking, for instance, at verification of the properties of swarms of autonomous 
entities [18]. 
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3.3 Natural Language Contracts: Question 2 
 
For automation of the validation task of Question 2, we require both formal representation of the 
smart contract program and of the natural language contract.   One way that this may happen is 
via creation and application of a descriptive mark-up language for legal contracts that would tag 
the terms of contracts with formal (machine-readable) semantics.  A proposal for a mark-up 
language of this kind is the Legal Knowledge Interchange Format (LKIF), developed as part of 
the EC-funded research project Estrella [19]. Clack et al. [20, 21] have recently proposed a 
standardised format for storage and transmission of marked-up legal agreements, as part of a 
framework and meta-language that would incorporate both natural language documents and 
program code. Much work remains to be done in this area before we would have automation of 
the validation task of Question 2.  
 
 
3.4 Shared Understandings and Intentions:  Question 1 
 
The tasks involved in the validation task of Question 1 are probably the most challenging of 
these tasks to automate. The human expertise involved is legal expertise, and for contracts in 
particular domains, such as commodity futures or trade finance, it may need to be very 
specialist.  However, against that, many of the proposed applications of smart contracts are for 
repeated and essentially routine applications, where only some parameters vary from one 
instantiation to the next. The spectrum proposed in [5], for instance, includes cases where the 
encoded component is merely payment actions or is similarly limited.  One may thus imagine 
using human expertise to, say, create and validate a collection of template natural language 
contracts along with parameters representing the understandings (beliefs) and intentions of 
participants.  An example could be the choice of legal jurisdiction under which disagreements 
about the contract would be adjudicated. Such parameters would be chosen by the participants 
– either individually or jointly – and instantiated into the written contract. A theory of document 
modeling in legal domains has been proposed by [22], and this could encompass such 
activities. 
 
We could view these efforts as seeking to automate the creation of, and the provision of legal 
and computational advice on, smart contracts.  These goals would be best understood within 
the context of a larger and long-running research agenda within AI to formalize legal reasoning, 
both to understand it and as support for its automation.  Limitations of space and scope prevent 
us pursuing these ideas here.   
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed some of the issues involved in the validation and verification of 
smart contracts running over distributed ledgers. While formal verification of computer programs 
and systems has a long history in computer science, with many successful commercial 
applications, there are features of this application domain which create major research and 
implementation challenges for automated verification and validation of smart contracts.   While 
none of these challenges is insurmountable, they will take time and effort to be resolved.    
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